Trump may have delayed his plans, but he's marked out the contours of the next level of escalation in the US-Israel war on Iran by identifying power plants as legitimate targets in case Tehran doesn't back off on blocking the Strait of Hormuz. Targeting energy infrastructure is a leaf straight out of the Russia playbook against Ukraine, where the West has had to invest large sums in ensuring the Ukrainian grid keeps functioning despite Russian attacks.
What would happen if Trump were to execute his earlier threat? It's a high-risk strategy, and that's why the reportedly new round of talks, subsequently denied by Iran. Iran has already said it will respond by targeting power utilities of Gulf countries and, possibly, even desalination plants. This would mean the West may have to step in, a la Ukraine, to help these countries economically hit hardest by the closure of Hormuz.
In fact, in an unusual turn of events, Gulf countries have recently floated a Chapter 7 UNSCR against Iran for blocking the strait, calling for UN-backed use of force to ensure freedom of navigation as per international law. This is the second GCC-sponsored resolution this month, the first to talk about 'use of force'. The draft is believed to also mention the option of imposing UN-backed sanctions on Iran if it digs in its heels.
Also Read | Trump puts off threat to bomb Iran power grid, Iranian agency denies report of talks to end war
Tehran, for its part, will count on Russia, and China, to veto any such resolution. While that politics plays out in New York, there will be cascading effects - both intended and unintended - of any such escalation.
In the first round, militarily the conflict will take an ugly turn as more civilian infrastructure becomes legitimate targets. 'Ukrainisation' of the war will begin with Iran aiming to cause maximum civilian damage in the region, further provoking US-Israel retaliation aimed at securing Hormuz. This won't be easy and may require troops on the ground, which will lead to a longer stand-off, unless Iran relents. But Gulf countries will need protection for energy and other civilian infra, raising the cost of war.
Over the past few years, 24 countries have pooled in resources to raise €1.8 bn as part of the Ukraine Energy Support Fund. Last December, through one of the most complex logistical exercises ever carried out, an entire thermal power plant involving 2,400 t of equipment was relocated from Lithuania to Ukraine, adding to the 9,200-odd power generators and 7,000-plus transformers to help Kyiv tide over the crisis following Russian attacks on its energy infra.
Also Read |Pakistan pitches mediator role in US-Israel-Iran war; Asim Munir, Trump hold talks: Report
The US will have to factor in similar assistance to Gulf countries if Iran were to target their energy infrastructure. It will also need to take into account reluctance of its European allies to get involved in this war. After all, Trump pulled out of many US commitments to Ukraine, including contribution to the energy support fund.
So, the path up the escalation ladder for the US will mean it having to take the call on driving home the ground advantage to achieve military victory at all costs. It could work best for US if Iran capitulates quickly through a short ground offensive. But if it stretches, consequences will weigh heavy on Trump economically and politically. Hence a revisit to talks.
Iran, on the other hand, will look for support from Russia and China, as it tries to hold on to Hormuz, its best leverage. In fact, it has, in the past two days, stopped all traffic across the Hormuz on safety grounds, telling trusted interlocutors that it fears attacks could be engineered on foreign ships and wrongly blamed on Iran.
The final pivot of escalation for the US is political with external and domestic dimensions. On the first count, the chasm between the Trump regime and its European allies will grow. Will this force Trump to rethink the US line on the Ukraine war, try talking to Russia, and prioritise a deal in West Asia? This is a strategic imponderable for now. But a recalibration can't be ruled out now that Russian oil is temporarily off sanctions.
On the domestic front, Trump continues to hold on to his MAGA base despite criticism. But a longer commitment into a seemingly 'forever war' will not give him the sort of political impetus he's looking for, given his campaign slogan against long-drawn wars. And for this reason, a 'victory', even if it means a deal on Hormuz, might be an acceptable takeaway as the Iranian government survives to live another day.
But Iran will want more predictability against future attacks in such a deal. Already, military assessments on Iran's hidden capabilities, including nuclear, are being scrutinised again, especially after its missile hit on far-off Diego Garcia, which conveyed an Iranian ballistic missile capability of 4,000 km. Though Iran has not confirmed it, the incident has rattled all who had assessed that Tehran didn't have capabilities to hit beyond 2,000 km. So, Iran will drive a tough bargain.
Either way, Trump's political timeline has spanned itself out between the escalation during Eid/Nowruz and what he can achieve by Easter on April 5. Else, the war is likely to enter a more dangerous, violent and potentially uncontrollable phase - one that will not just disrupt economic realities but also potentially upset political order.
What would happen if Trump were to execute his earlier threat? It's a high-risk strategy, and that's why the reportedly new round of talks, subsequently denied by Iran. Iran has already said it will respond by targeting power utilities of Gulf countries and, possibly, even desalination plants. This would mean the West may have to step in, a la Ukraine, to help these countries economically hit hardest by the closure of Hormuz.
In fact, in an unusual turn of events, Gulf countries have recently floated a Chapter 7 UNSCR against Iran for blocking the strait, calling for UN-backed use of force to ensure freedom of navigation as per international law. This is the second GCC-sponsored resolution this month, the first to talk about 'use of force'. The draft is believed to also mention the option of imposing UN-backed sanctions on Iran if it digs in its heels.
Also Read | Trump puts off threat to bomb Iran power grid, Iranian agency denies report of talks to end war
Tehran, for its part, will count on Russia, and China, to veto any such resolution. While that politics plays out in New York, there will be cascading effects - both intended and unintended - of any such escalation.
In the first round, militarily the conflict will take an ugly turn as more civilian infrastructure becomes legitimate targets. 'Ukrainisation' of the war will begin with Iran aiming to cause maximum civilian damage in the region, further provoking US-Israel retaliation aimed at securing Hormuz. This won't be easy and may require troops on the ground, which will lead to a longer stand-off, unless Iran relents. But Gulf countries will need protection for energy and other civilian infra, raising the cost of war.
Over the past few years, 24 countries have pooled in resources to raise €1.8 bn as part of the Ukraine Energy Support Fund. Last December, through one of the most complex logistical exercises ever carried out, an entire thermal power plant involving 2,400 t of equipment was relocated from Lithuania to Ukraine, adding to the 9,200-odd power generators and 7,000-plus transformers to help Kyiv tide over the crisis following Russian attacks on its energy infra.
Also Read |Pakistan pitches mediator role in US-Israel-Iran war; Asim Munir, Trump hold talks: Report
The US will have to factor in similar assistance to Gulf countries if Iran were to target their energy infrastructure. It will also need to take into account reluctance of its European allies to get involved in this war. After all, Trump pulled out of many US commitments to Ukraine, including contribution to the energy support fund.
So, the path up the escalation ladder for the US will mean it having to take the call on driving home the ground advantage to achieve military victory at all costs. It could work best for US if Iran capitulates quickly through a short ground offensive. But if it stretches, consequences will weigh heavy on Trump economically and politically. Hence a revisit to talks.
Iran, on the other hand, will look for support from Russia and China, as it tries to hold on to Hormuz, its best leverage. In fact, it has, in the past two days, stopped all traffic across the Hormuz on safety grounds, telling trusted interlocutors that it fears attacks could be engineered on foreign ships and wrongly blamed on Iran.
The final pivot of escalation for the US is political with external and domestic dimensions. On the first count, the chasm between the Trump regime and its European allies will grow. Will this force Trump to rethink the US line on the Ukraine war, try talking to Russia, and prioritise a deal in West Asia? This is a strategic imponderable for now. But a recalibration can't be ruled out now that Russian oil is temporarily off sanctions.
On the domestic front, Trump continues to hold on to his MAGA base despite criticism. But a longer commitment into a seemingly 'forever war' will not give him the sort of political impetus he's looking for, given his campaign slogan against long-drawn wars. And for this reason, a 'victory', even if it means a deal on Hormuz, might be an acceptable takeaway as the Iranian government survives to live another day.
But Iran will want more predictability against future attacks in such a deal. Already, military assessments on Iran's hidden capabilities, including nuclear, are being scrutinised again, especially after its missile hit on far-off Diego Garcia, which conveyed an Iranian ballistic missile capability of 4,000 km. Though Iran has not confirmed it, the incident has rattled all who had assessed that Tehran didn't have capabilities to hit beyond 2,000 km. So, Iran will drive a tough bargain.
Either way, Trump's political timeline has spanned itself out between the escalation during Eid/Nowruz and what he can achieve by Easter on April 5. Else, the war is likely to enter a more dangerous, violent and potentially uncontrollable phase - one that will not just disrupt economic realities but also potentially upset political order.
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this column are that of the writer. The facts and opinions expressed here do not reflect the views of www.economictimes.com.)
Pranab Dhal Samanta
Pranab is a trusted byline in his chosen areas of national politics, governance, security and international affairs for over two decades. His column State of Play is a regular feature in The Economic Times. Has reported extensively within and outside India, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Israel during his career, besides having led reporting teams across organisations. Was awarded the Ramnath Goenka Award for Excellence for his writings on the Indo-US nuclear deal.